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Abstract 
This paper tests two hypothesis 1) that firms entering financial distress incur costs that depress 
the stock price 2)  firms entering financial distress are over sold, and the year after they enter 
financial distress the price bounces back. The paper tests a simple trading strategy of buying the 
distressed firm and selling the largest firm in the industry. The strategy yields an average return 
of 10.16%. The returns are enhanced by sorting firms by price to book and selecting firms from 
the highest quartile, yielding an average return of 34. 75% 
It is important to determine what exactly it means for a firm to enter financial distress. 
There are many different proxies for financial distress. Campbell, Hilscher, Szilagyi (2008) and 
O'Doherty (2009) use a 12-month-forward looking estimate of failure risk, adjusted every 
January from 1981 to 2003 using historical data. Garlappi and Yan (2011) define financial 
distress as when shareholders either enter into strategic renegotiations with debt holders or the 
firm files for bankruptcy. Vassalou and Xing (2004) use a value called distance-to-default based 
off of the Black-Scholes model. They use the value of the firm's liabilities as the strike price, 
when the value of the firm's assets are less than the strike price the value of equity is zero. 
Whitaker (2000) defines the beginning of financial distress as the first year in which cash flow is 
less than current maturities of long-term debt. Firms have many options to cover current 
maturities but many of those options come at a cost; these costs may affect the firm's 
performance in the long run. Because of this issue a forward-looking estimate would not 
accurately calculate costs of financial distress. Naturally firms will have a net cash flow less than 
current maturities before they file for bankruptcy or enter into negotiations with debt holders. 
Therefore if financial distress is classified as bankruptcy, renegotiation, or default you may miss 
some firms that incur costs of financial distress but recover via other methods. The proxy for 
financial distress in this paper is a year with cash flow less than current maturities in order to 
account for all costs or benefits of financial distress. 
This paper centers on the idea that there are costs associated with financial distress. 
Alderson and Betker (1996) find that complete liquidation can consume over one third of firm 
value; although the firms in this paper will not undergo complete liquidation. They also find a 
negative relationship between liquidation costs and fixed-to-total assets, a positive relation 
between market-to-book ratio liquidation costs and a positive relation between research and 
development expenses and liquidation costs. Zhang (2011) looks at a shareholder advantage that 
affects renegotiation frictions from the dispersion of ownership and complexity in capital 
structure. Bondholder dispersion, shareholder dispersion and short term debt are used to proxy 
for renegotiation frictions. For firms with only private debt there is a significant negative 
relation between distress risk and stock returns. Therefore there is a strong shareholder 
advantage in firms with only private debt. On the other hand shareholder advantage is not 
observed for firms with private and public debt. Giffin and Lemmon's work (2002) show that 
firms with high distress risk exhibit the largest return reversals around earnings announcements. 
They also argue that book-to-market return premium is biggest for small firms with low analyst 
coverage, as is also supported by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) 
Garlappi and Yan (2011) argue that for most firms there is a hump-shaped relationship 
between equity beta, as well as between expected returns and default probability. That is only 
true if there is a chance that shareholders will recover from financial distress. In addition they 
argue momentum profits in stock returns are more pronounced when there is high default 
probability. 
This paper tests a hypothesis that firms which enter financial distress will earn below 
normal returns and develop a trading strategy designed to generate abnormal returns. Whitaker 
(2000) finds that in the five years following financial distress the industry adjusted market value 
declines 57.07% with an average annual decline of 11.29%. He finds that the costs of financial 
distress increases with severity of financial distress, improvement in the industry, and reductions 
in capital expenditures. In addition he finds costs of financial distress decline with cost saving 
management actions, and increased stock holdings by the board of directors. Campbell, 
Hilscher, and szilagyi (2008) run a similar analysis with similar results. They find that distressed 
portfolios have low average returns, high standard deviations, and high market betas. They tend 
to perform poorly when market wide implied volatility increases. They argue that value and size 
effect are not great proxies for financial distress. On the other hand V assalsou and Xing (2004) 
found conflicting evidence. They find that small firms earn higher returns than big firms if they 
have high default risk, also value stocks outperform growth stocks if they both have high default 
risk. O'Doherty (2009) argues that a conditional version of CAPM can explain abnormal returns 
for financially distressed stocks. 
Sample Selection and Methodology 
A firm experiences financial distress when cash flow is less than current maturities. 
When a firm experiences financial distress they have many options to raise cash to prevent a 
default including lowering inventory, selling assets, drawing from a line of bank credit or 
utilizing cash reserves. Many of these options to raise cash come at a cost. Vassalsou and Xing 
(2004) (VX hereafter) argue that some firms can recover from financial distress and out perform 
their industry particularly if they are small value firms. Other research has shown contrary 
evidence. Campbell, Hilscher, and szilagyi (2008)(CHS here after) and Whitaker (2000) find 
that the industry adjusted stock returns of distressed firms declines even after recovery from 
financial distress. This contradicting evidence creates two competing hypotheses that a portfolio 
with that is short a firm recovering from financial distress and long the industry leader will yield 
abnormal returns or a portfolio long a firm recovering from financial distress, and short the 
industry leader will yield abnormal returns because the distressed firms are oversold. 
This paper samples firms which enter financial distress between 2002 and 2006. The 
firms are selected from Compustat. The sample is selects the thirty most severely distressed 
firms in each of the five years. Severity of financial distress is defined as: 
(CMLTD - CF)/TA 
Where 
CML TD: Current maturities of long term debt 
In order to observe long term effects of financial distress relevant stock performance is pulled 
from CRSP for the three years following entry into financial distress. For comparison purposes 
the stock and accounting data was also pulled for the three years preceding entry into financial 
distress. Firms with cash flow less than current maturities of long term debt in the past 3 years 
were excluded from the sample to ensure the firms are entering financial distress for the first 
time. The industry leader of the distressed firm's industry is defined by a firm with the same SIC 
code as the firm in financial distress with the largest market cap. In addition the industry leader 
must have over a billion dollars in assets and cannot be in financial distress. If a firm did not 
have a qualifying industry leader then it was removed from the sample. 
The test of two means is used to test a hypothesis that excess returns can be generated 
using a trading strategy of 
Where t= 1 ,2,3 
Where t== 1,2,3 
Literature suggests certain firm variables are significant predictors of the performance for 
the distressed firm. The variables are size, severity of financial distress, market to book value of 
equity, leverage, and research and development expense; up to two outliers where removed from 
each year based on these variables. Previous research has shown conflicting evidence whether or 
not the size and value effects have an influence of stock returns of firms under financial distress. 
The value effect can be measured with a ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of 
equity. A firm with a low market to book ratio is known as a value stock and if the firm has a 
high market to book it is known as a growth stock. The relationship between a firm's size and its 
stock return is known as the size effect. VX argue that small firms earn higher returns than big 
firms if they have high default risk, also value stocks outperform growth stocks if they both have 
high default risk. On the other hand, CHS find evidence supporting the idea that a firm's size 
and value do not have a significant relationship to market returns. One major difference between 
the studies done by VX and CHS is the proxy used to determine if a firm is in financial distress, 
CHS uses their own scale for financial distress composed primarily of backward looking 
financial data; Whereas VX' s model for financial distress applies the firms value of assets and 
value of liabilities to the black- Scholes model. The difference in the results can also possibly be 
attributed to different variables which were controlled for. VX focused on size, Book to market 
ratio and the amount of risk of default. On the other hand CHS looked at beta, market volatility, 
net income to total assets, leverage, and market value. CHS finds that highly leveraged stocks 
are more likely to fail than less leveraged stocks, but if they do not fail they have high average 
returns. Alderson and Betker (2001) find firms with research and development expense have 
higher costs of financial distress which would indicate they would not perform as well. 
The following regression determines the relationship between the difference in returns 
of the firm in financial distress and the industry leader and the significant firm variables, size, 
severity of distress, market to book ratio leverage and research and development expense. 
Where: 
Ri = the percentage return of the of industry leader (based on market cap) from the year the firm 
enters financial distress for the following three years 
Rpv= the percentage return of the firm in financial distress from the year it enters financial 
distress for the following three years 
RD= amount which the firm spent on research and development in the year which the firm enters 
financial distress divided by total assets 
D 
- measurement for leverage by dividing the total book value amount of debt of the firm by the 
Wo 
book valueworth of the firm (in the year the firm entered financial distress) 














. ) --------- eventy o mancia 1stress: cas ow net mcome+ epreciation an amort1zat1on TA0 
--current maturities of long term debt I total assets. 
Size= log of market cap of firm (number of shares x price per share) 
The regression above uses the difference between the industry leader and the firm in 
financial distress; whereas the regression below includes the return of the S&P 500. Subtracting 
the return of the S&P 500 provides the abnormal return produced from longing the industry 
leader and shorting a firm in financial distress. 
Where: 
b b D b ME CF-CMLTD0 . (Ri - Rp0)-Rs&P 500 = a +  i RD0 + 2 - + 3 - + b4 + b5 Size Wo BE TAo 
Rs&P 500= represents the return of the overall market. Calculated as the percentage return of the 
S&P 500 from the year the firm enters financial distress for the following three years. 
Using the regression above the sample is split into four portfolios based on the variables 
which are most significant in the regression. Shorting the firm in financial distress and longing 
the industry leader. Each of the portfolios represents a quartile of a statistically significant 
variable from high to low. The average return of each portfolio is then found. If there is a 
significant difference in return between the four portfolios it will give more clear insight on 
which variables to look for when creating a portfolio that is short a firm in financial distress and 
long an industry leader. 
Empirical Results 
This section reports ( 1 )  the change of firm value relative to the industry leader after 
entering financial distress, and (2) which qualities of the firm will make the change significant. 
Change in Firm Value After Experiencing Financial distress 
Table 1 reports the performance of the stock of a firm that enters financial distress, the 
stock performance adjusted against the industry leader, and also against the S&P 500. The year 
after the firm enters financial distress firm value increases an average of 24.85%. Two years 
after the firm enters financial distress firm value increases an average of 12.79%. The firm in 
financial distress outperforms the industry leader on average by 10. 1 6% and .632% one and two 
years following entry into financial distress respectively. On average, the distressed firms 
outperformed the market by 14.43% and 14.90% one and two years following entrance into 
financial distress respectively. 
Table 1. Mean change in market value following entry into financial distress N=93 
Table 1 reports the mean percentage change in firm value for a distressed firm, after adjusted by 
subtracting returns of the industry leader, and by subtracting the market return from the 
distressed firm's return. 
year Unadjusted Adjusted vs. market 
rfd1 rfd1 - rz r1d1 - S&PSOO 
Return Return t stat Return t stat 
+ 1  .2485 . 1016  2.408 . 1443 12.379 
+2 . 1279 .00632 -0.063 . 1490 1.45 
These results are in line with Vassalsou and Xing (2004) who found that firms earn 
higher returns than big firms if they have high default risk. These initial results support the 
second hypothesis. 
Determining post-financial distress firm performance 
Previous literature has provided evidence about which characteristics of a firm are 
significant in the performance of the stock after entering financial distress. The literature 
suggests that research and development expense, leverage, severity of distress, price to book and 
size could all be significant in predicting stock performance after entering financial distress. 
Table 3 reports the results from the regression. Size, measured my market value, is the most 
significant variable as displayed in table 3 size tends to have one of the highest t statistics in most 
of the five years. Furthermore price to book seems to be a significant variable with a significant 
t statistic in most years. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) came up with opposite results, 
and state that these two variables do not play a significant role. The difference in results could 
be contributed to two differences, ( 1 )  the Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi sample used a much 
later proxy for financial distress, and (2) the Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi sample also 
smaller firms. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables N=93 
Table 2 reports the means, medians and correlation coefficients of the independent variables used 
. th . l 
. 
m e cross-sect1ona regression 
MEAN MEDIAN 
RD 60.59 30.016 
DIW 34.76 33. 754 
ME 3.298 2.858 -
BE 
CF-CMLTD0 .013 .02 
TA0 
size 3430.16 2205.22 
RD DIW ME CF-CMLTD0 Size -
BE TA0 
RD 1 
DIW -.06621 1 
ME -.05348 -0.38721 1 -
BE 
CF-CMLTD0 -0.08748 -0.00671 .16496 1 
TA0 
Size 0.059154 0.069997 0.067416 .287542 1 
Table 3. Significance of Variables 
Table 3 reports the Coefficient and t statistic for each variable for the year following the year the 
firm entered financial distress 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat Coetftcient t stat Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat 
Intercept 62.302 1.274 -25.143 -1.458 -35.331 -2.259 -57.855 -3.59 .8367 .0285 
D/W -0.721 -1.048 0.909 1.811 0.769 2.447 1.114 2.859 0.5848 1.178 
P/B -6.589 -0.496 -13.464 -2.375 .757 .220 -4.634 -1.999 -11.624 -1.67 
SIZE -0.019 -2.669 0.0007 2.421 .0007 .3311 .007 2.599 .004 1.147 
Based on these results a trading strategy can be formed to realize abnormal returns. 
Following the second hypothesis of this paper, the trading strategy involves purchasing a firm in 
financial distress, and shorting the industry leader. Furthermore, size and price to book can 
emphasize the returns. In a sample of experiencing financial distress in a given year that is 
sorted based on size the half of the firms should realize average returns of 12.5%, where as the 
smaller half should realize average returns of around 7 .81 %. If the same sample is divided into 
quartiles greater returns can be realized. As seen in table 3 below the second largest quartile on 
average had the highest returns of 24.04% followed by the third and fourth largest with returns of 
11.07% and 4.56% accordingly. 
Table 4. Quartile return based on firm size N=93 
Table 4 reports the mean percentage returns of firms minus the return of the industry leader 
separate d 
. 




d fi mto quart1 es om argest to sm est ase on irm size o t e istresse 
Quartile Return 





***significant at the 1% level 
rm. 
If the same sample is sorted by price to book similar results can be found. As seen in 
table 4 the quartile with the largest price to book, or growth firms, realize the largest returns of 
34.75%, and the following three quartiles realized returns of 22.74%, 14.46% and 5.54% 
accordingly the year after the firm entered financial distress. 
Table 5. Quartile return based on price to book N=93 
Table 5 reports the mean percentage returns of firms minus the return of the industry leader 
separate d "  art"l fr I t t  ll t b  d 
. 
t b  k f th d"t d fi  mto qu 1 es om arges o sma es ase on pnce o 00 0 e is resse rm. 
Quartile Return 





**Significant at the 5% level 
Conclusion 
The results provide support of the hypotheses that firms in financial distress are oversold 
as a result the year after the firm enters financial distress the firm value will bounce back and 
experience abnormal returns. Also the results provided evidence that price to book is an 
indicator of the amount of returns on the stock. This suggests a trading strategy of shorting the 
industry leader, and longing the firm in financial distress. The returns can be maximized by 
sorting the distressed firms into quartiles, and purchasing the firms with the highest price to 
book. This trading strategy should yield an average annual return of 34.75% 
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